What changes for Andorra under the EU Agreement?

Sovereignty and justice

• Rulings of the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) become binding on Andorra (art. 96): EU law will be interpreted uniformly, above Andorran discretion.
• Article 65 of the Constitution requires a two-thirds majority of the General Council to ratify treaties that transfer legislative, executive or judicial powers: the Agreement transfers all three.
• The agreement can be applied provisionally before ratification or a referendum. Current treaty law does not allow it, but that law can be amended by ordinary majority and open this path without a two-thirds vote in the General Council.
• Provisional application would already replace the 1990 Customs Agreement: the Andorra Protocol (Art. 4) states the new customs union "replaces and succeeds" it, and Framework Protocol 2 does not list it among the agreements that survive. Nothing guarantees it would revive if ratification ultimately failed.
• Critics argue the EU dictated the timelines and terms, leaving Andorra little room to negotiate.

Immigration and population pressure

The agreement sets a minimum annual net increase in long-term residence permits for EU citizens (until 2037, according to the text):

• Qualitative controls weaken: it becomes harder to refuse or revoke residence over criminal records or public-security grounds, assessed under EU and CJEU standards rather than stricter Andorran ones.
• This pressure adds to the housing crisis and the strain on public services.

Housing and free movement of capital

• The agreement prohibits restrictions on the free movement of capital (art. 27): property purchases by EU residents cannot be limited, including secondary residences.
• This makes protective measures — such as favoring local residents in access to housing — difficult or impossible.
• San Marino secured protections in this area; Andorra did not.

Country model and social fabric

• Insufficient protections for local workers and the country's economy; unions have criticized the lack of consultation.
• Alignment with the EU changes the Andorran model almost irreversibly and may draw the country into external risks and conflicts.

Democratic process

• A negotiation perceived as rushed, without the protections other microstates obtained.
• In Andorra the referendum is neither mandatory nor binding: any “binding” character rests on a political commitment, not a constitutional obligation.
• Repeated delays of the referendum promised in the 2023–2027 election programme, while signature advances and provisional application is debated.
• The Agreement can be signed before the people are consulted, then put to ratification in an already conditioned setting.
• Polls show strong opposition or widespread indecision among citizens, with variation by group.

Mixed agreement and EU timeline

• The EU Council has confirmed that the Agreement is mixed: it needs ratification by the European Parliament and by the parliaments of all 27 member states — a process that can take years.
• That can place the Andorran consultation at the end of the chain, after other capitals have already spoken.
• The calendar has been shaped by external actors: months of blockage over Bulgaria’s reservation, Monaco’s earlier exit, or the pace set by San Marino and the EU; Andorra has had little real control over the timeline.

Where things stand (July 2026)

• The EU Council has approved the text and authorises signature and, at EU level, provisional application of parts of the Agreement.
• The Government says Andorra cannot apply the Agreement provisionally without General Council ratification after a referendum; critics warn that reforming the Law on Treaties could open that door.
• Likely steps: signature → (possible) provisional application at EU level → referendum and ratification in Andorra → ratifications in the 27 member states and the European Parliament → full entry into force.
• The Government has warned of possible European “retaliation” if a future executive shelves the Agreement after the 2027 elections; the opposition reads this as political pressure and demands substance and a date for the vote.